[1] Fla. Stat. § 689.01 (2022).[2]Id.

[3] Fla. Stat. § 689.03 (2022).

[4]B.W.B. Corp. v. Muscare, 349 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (“The usual common law covenants included in a warranty deed in Florida are the covenants of seisin . . ., quiet enjoyment against encumbrances and that the grantor will warrant and defend the title.”); but see, Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. Arbuthnot, 116 So. 237, 238 (1928) (describing the covenant of seisin and good right to convey as a singular covenant and holding in that case that“[i]n [that] declaration was combined a covenant of seizin and good right to convey and a covenant of warranty of title. The breach is alleged of both covenants”).

[5] Burton v. Price, 141 So. 728, 729 (Fla. 1932).

[6] Gore v. Gen. Props. Corp., 6 So.2d 837, 839-40 (Fla. 1942).

[7] Id. at 698 (quoting “Thompson on Real Property”) (“The covenant against encumbrances is a covenant in praesenti, and is broken as soon as made, if there is an outstanding paramount title, or any existing charge, burden, or interest diminishing the value or enjoyment of the land”).

[8] Id. at 698-699 (quoting “Thompson on Real Property”) (When, however . . . [the covenant against encumbrances] is coupled to the covenant for quiet enjoyment, immediately following it and connected with it by the word ‘and’, it may be a covenant in futuro . . .”).

[9] See Harris v. Sklarew, 166 So.2d 164, 166 (Fla. 1964) (quoting Professor Boyer’s “Florida Real Estate Transactions”) (“. . . [T]he general warranty covenant . . . warrants against the claims of ‘all persons whomsoever.’”); see also Fla. Stat. § 689.02 (2022) (“. . . [T]he said party of the first part does hereby fully warrant the title to said land, and will defend the same against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever”).

[10] Fla. Stat. § 689.03 (2022).

[11] See, Pierson v. Bill, 182 So. 631, 634 (Fla. 1938) (using the definition found in Black’s Law Dictionary).

[12] Id. at 635 (quoting Alsterberg v. Bennett, 106 N.W. 49, 51 (N.D. 1905)) (“The absence of express or implied covenants in a deed is equivalent to an express declaration therein that the grantor assumes to convey only his right or interest, whatever it may be, and that he declines to bind himself to do more.”); See also Miami Holding Corp. v. Matthews, 311 So. 2d 802, 803 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (“It is well established that the execution of a quitclaim deed, without more, does not necessarily import that the grantor possesses any interest at all and if the grantor has no interest in the land described at the time of conveyance, the quitclaim conveys nothing to the grantee”).

[13] Harkless v. Laubhan, 278 So. 3d 728, 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (“A party is a bona fide purchaser only when three conditions are met: (1) the purchaser obtained legal title to the challenged property, (2) the purchaser paid the value of the challenged property, and (3) the purchaser had no knowledge of the claimed interest against the challenged property at the time of the transaction”).

[14] Fla Stat. § 695.01 (“No conveyance . . . of real property . . .  shall be good and effectual in law or equity against . . . subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration and without notice, unless the same be recorded according to law[.]”) (2022).

[15] See McCausland v. Davis, 204 So.2d 334, 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967).

[16] Id. at 335-336.

[17] Pierson at 635 (quoting Babcock v. Wells, 105 Am. St.Rep. 854, 858 (R.I. 1903)) (“The argument has generally prevailed that as a quit-claim deed purports to convey only the interest of the grantor, it cannot have any operation when he has already parted with his interest, and that it is not material that his grantee had no actual notice of that fact; that the restricted language of the conveyance is equivalent to notice and, as a final result, that he who accepts such a conveyance cannot, within the meaning of the registry acts, be a bona fide purchaser . . .”).

[18] See Fla. Stat. § 695.01(2) (2022).

[19] City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So.2d 439, 447 (Fla. 1978) (“This can be so even though a deed is not part of the chain of title emanating from the sovereign and is therefore often called an ‘interloping’ or ‘wild’ deed”).

[20] Fla. Stat. § 712.001 (2022).

[21] Fla. Stat. § 712.04 (2022) (“. . . a marketable record title is free and clear of all estates, interests, claims, covenants, restrictions, or charges, the existence of which depends upon any act, title transaction, event, zoning requirement, building or development permit, or omission that occurred before the effective date of the root of title”); see also Fla. Stat. § 712.02 (2022) (“Any person having the legal capacity to own land in this state, who . . .  has been vested with any estate in land of record for 30 years or more, shall have a marketable record title to such estate in said land, which shall be free and clear of all claims. . . ”).

[22] Fla. Stat. § 712.01(6) (2022).

[23] City of Miami at 447 (“This court . . .  ha[s] made it clear that the Marketable Record Title Act deviates from common law and prior statutes and, by dicta, ha[s] said that a wild deed, properly executed and recorded, may establish a new and valid title after 30 years”).

[24] Id. at 447.

[25] Johnson v. Davis, 480 So.2d 625, 627 (Fla. 1985) (“In the state of Florida, relief for a fraudulent misrepresentation may be granted only when the following elements are present: (1) a false statement concerning a material fact; (2) the representor's knowledge that the representation is false; (3) an intention that the representation induce another to act on it; and, (4) consequent injury by the party acting in reliance on the representation”).

[26] Pryor v. Oak Ridge Dev. Corp., 119 So. 326, 329 (Fla. 1928) (citing Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence § 887).

[27] Johnson at 627 (finding that the affirmative statement that there were no issues with the home’s roof after receiving an initial deposit payment, but before receiving an additional deposit payment, was a false representation of material fact).

[28] See Winfield Invs. v. Pascal-Gaston Invs., 254 So.3d 589, 593 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) analyzing the Florida Supreme Court’s holdings with regard to a purchaser’s reliance on the seller’s representations about a property.

[29] Id. at 593 (quoting Besett v. Basnett, 389 So.2d 995, 997 (1980) (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 540-541))

[30] Besett at 997.

[31] Beagle v. Bagwell, 215 So.2d 24, 25 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (“[W]here a purchaser of a house has ample opportunity to inspect . . . or obtain an expert for that purpose and elects instead to accept as true the vendor's statement . . . , the purchaser could not assert that he had been misled by the vendor's representations”).

[32] Id. at 26 (“In essence, then, where a vendor by his actual deception, artifice, or misconduct conceals the evidence of a defective condition in such a way as to render it incapable of detection from a reasonable and ordinary inspection of the house, the vendor can no longer rely upon the purchaser's duty to inspect . . . .”).

[33] Haskell Co. v. Lane Co., 612 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (quoting Biff Craine “Real Property – Seller’s Liability for Nondisclosure of Real Property Defects”) (“The doctrine of caveat emptor (literally, ‘let the buyer beware’) provides that, when parties deal at arm's length, buyers are expected to fend for themselves, protected only by their own skepticism as to the value and condition of the subject of the transaction. Absent an express agreement, a material misrepresentation or active concealment of a material fact, the seller cannot be held liable for any harm sustained by the buyer or others as the result of a defect existing at the time of the sale.”) (quotations omitted) (citations omitted).

[34] Johnson at 627-628 (Holding, in the context of a residential real estate transaction, “It would be contrary to all notions of fairness and justice for this Court to place its stamp of approval on an affirmative misrepresentation by a wrongdoer just because it was made after the signing of the executory contract when all of the necessary elements for actionable fraud are present.”); see also Green Acres, Inc. v. First Union Nat’l. Bank of Fla., 637 So.2d 363, 365 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (“We do not agree that Johnson extended the duty to disclose to commercial real estate transactions”).

[35] Johnson at 629 (“[W]here the seller of a home knows of facts materially affecting the value of the property which are not readily observable and are not known to the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer”).

[36] Green Acres at 365. (“While the first district [court of appeals] expressed a desire to extend a duty to disclose known material facts to commercial transactions, it recognized the appropriate procedure was to certify the question to the supreme court [of Florida] which it did. Unfortunately the supreme court did not answer the question”).

[37] Green Acres at 364 (“Exceptions arise: 1) where some artifice or trick has been employed to prevent the purchaser from making independent inquiry; 2) where the other party does not have equal opportunity to become apprised of the fact; and, 3) where a party undertakes to disclose facts and fails to disclose the whole truth”).

[38] Fla. Stat. § 689.01 (2022).

[39] Pate v. Mellen, 237 So.2d 266, 267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970) (“Although admitting that there exists a legal distinction between fraud and forgery, appellant reasons that since forgery is a species of fraud, the same rule applicable to the burden of proof in establishing fraud should be applied in establishing forgery. With this contention we are unable to agree”).

[40] Id. at 267 (quoting Coulter v. Clemons, 372 S.W.2d 396 (Ark. 1963) (“This is not a case where it is contended that a deed was obtained by duress of fraud; under those circumstances, the law requires that the proof be clear, cogent and convincing . . . . Here, it is simply asserted by appellee that the deed was a forgery, and the quantum of proof necessary to sustain such an allegation is a preponderance of the evidence”)).

[41] Marshall v. Hollywood 236 So.2d 114, 116 (Fla. 1970) (“The District Court held, in effect, that the [Market Record Title] Act confers marketability to a chain of title arising out of a forged or a wild deed, so long as the strict requirements of the Act are met. We affirm this decision”).

[42] See, Knowles v. Edwards, 967 So.2d 255, 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)

[43] Id.

[44] See McCoy v. Love 382 So.2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1979) (“Where all the essential legal requisites of a deed are present, it conveys legal title. Fraud in the inducement renders such a legally effective deed voidable in equity”).

[45] Hendricks v. Stark, 126 So. 293, 294 (Fla. 1930) (applying rules for rescinding a contract to a deed) (“Where a party, with knowledge of facts entitling him to rescission of a contract or conveyance, afterward, without fraud or duress, ratifies the same, he has no claim to the relief of cancellation. An express ratification is not required in order thus to defeat his remedy[.]”).

[46] Id. at 297 (“It has been repeatedly held that a person by the acceptance of benefits may be estopped from questioning the validity and effect of a contract; and, where one has an election to ratify or disaffirm a conveyance, he can either claim under or against it, but he cannot do both . . .”) (emphasis added).

[47] Id. at 294 (. . . [A]ny acts of recognition of the contract as subsisting, or any conduct inconsistent with an intention of avoiding it, have the effect of an election to affirm”).

[48] Id. at 294 (“One having election to ratify or disaffirm conveyance having adopted one course with knowledge of facts cannot afterwards pursue the other”).

[49] Niesz v. Gehris, 418 So.2d 445 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (“In an action for rescission for substantial nonperformance of a contract, as in an action for rescission for misrepresentation in the inducement to enter into the contract, the buyers would have to return the property and all benefits received and would have been entitled to recover all funds paid and cancellation of their purchase money notes and mortgages”) (emphasis added).

[50] Royal v. Parado, 462 So.2d 849, 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“Generally, a contract will not be rescinded even for fraud when it is not possible for the opposing party to be put back into his pre-agreement status quo condition”).

[51] Pryor at 329 (“The misrepresentation to constitute ground for rescission must have been an inducement to the contract, otherwise it will be no ground for avoiding it”).

[52] Gold v. Wolkowitz, 430 So.2d 556, 557-558 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“We see no difference in the issues as framed in Besett and those present in the case sub judice. Both Wolkowitz and Ward knew that there was a cloud on the title to the real property in question. Despite their knowledge Ward prepared, and Wolkowitz executed, the affidavit reflecting no clouds on the title. Fraud in the inducement will support a punitive damage award”).

[53] Pate at 267 (quoting Coulter).

[54] Id.

[55] Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So.2d 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (quoting Rowland v. Holt, 70 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Ky. 1934)

[56] Gross v. Lyons, 763 So.2d 276, 280 (Fla. 2000) (footnote 1) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary).

[57] S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC, 139 So.3d 869, 872 (Fla. 2014).

[58] Fla. Stat. § 90.952 (2022).  

[59] Fla. Stat. § 90.951 (2022).

[60] Griem v. Zabala, 744 So.2d 1139, 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). (“Section 90.952, Florida Statutes (1995), requires that the original writing be offered when proving the contents of the writing . . . . Because a deed gives rise to a legal right, the contents of the deed are being proved; thus, a deed falls within the best evidence rule”).